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Abstract 
Focusing on the industrial sector of the EU ETS, this study identifies and analyses the entries and the 
exits of installations into and from the system over the period 2005-2013. The overall number of exits 
was notable relative to the number of installations, and significantly greater than that of the entries. 
Further, we estimate a hazard model for the risk of an installation exiting the EU ETS, which identifies 
a number of different factors referring to the installation, the firm, and the economy, explaining the 
occurrence of this event. In addition to these, an “end-of-phase effect” is found, whereby the chances 
of exit were significantly higher in the final years of the EU ETS Phases I and II. This effect, related to 
the rules concerning the closure of an installation and the withdrawal of the relative allowances, is 
detrimental to the allocative efficiency of the system and, therefore, to its cost-effectiveness in 
emissions abatement. The evidence provided by the study and some of its methodological aspects may 
be useful for future attempts to identify investment leakage in the EU ETS. 
Keywords 
EU ETS, entries and exits, manufacturing sector, hazard model, end-of-phase effect. 
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1. Introduction 
The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) constrains the greenhouse gas emissions of the EU’s 
electricity sector and energy-intensive industries. The EU ETS is currently the most prominent cap-
and-trade scheme in the world and the cornerstone of EU climate policy. Launched in 2005, its first 
decade has been turbulent in certain respects, principally due to the effects of the economic crisis. A 
large excess supply of emission allowances meant that the allowance price (hereafter also referred to 
as carbon price) plummeted and will probably stay lower than originally expected for a few years to 
come. A low carbon price is problematic in that it fails to trigger investment in emissions abatement, 
calling into question the relevance of the instrument. Regulatory initiatives for sustaining the 
allowance price have been taken
1
 and the revision of the EU ETS Directive recently proposed by the 
European Commission posits measures that will also influence the price. Many representatives of the 
regulated industries have expressed their concerns about the prospective impact of the EU ETS on the 
competitiveness of the respective sectors. Both the issuance of fewer allowances, as a result of the 
overall cap tightening, and the progressive substitution of grandfathering by auctioning, as a method 
for allocating the allowances, mean that the opportunity cost of holding the allowances will (to varying 
degrees across the sectors) gradually turn into the real cost of purchasing them. Avoiding 
competitiveness deterioration and ensuing carbon leakage, i.e. emissions moving to regions with less 
stringent carbon regulation, appears to be the main challenge for the EU ETS today. 
A number of studies have provided empirical assessments of carbon leakage in the EU ETS. Martin 
et al. (2014), Dechezleprêtre et al. (2014), Petrick and Wagner (2014), Branger et al. (2013), Chan et 
al. (2013), Sartor (2012) constitute the bulk of this growing literature. The emerging evidence is quite 
comforting, as non-negligible emissions reductions are attributed to the EU ETS and no evidence of 
carbon leakage has been found so far. All of these studies analyze competitiveness effects of unilateral 
carbon pricing over the short- or medium term. In the long run, competitiveness deterioration due to 
carbon costs may lead to long-term carbon leakage or what is commonly referred to as investment 
leakage; that is, relocation of carbon-regulated activities overseas, with permanent losses of jobs and 
capital use locally. While some studies have framed the problem theoretically (e.g., Cook [2011], 
Reinaud [2008], Matthes [2008]), to date no empirical contributions exist assessing investment 
leakage in the EU ETS. As time passes and new data are available, investigating such long-term 
effects becomes increasingly important and should also become increasingly viable. 
This paper offers new evidence concerning the past development of the EU ETS and its 
functioning. The analysis is relevant to investment leakage, but is not concerned with its identification. 
We deal with the “symptoms” of investment leakage, but our data do not allow us to ascertain whether 
investment leakage has been taking place. Using the registry of the EU ETS as primary information 
source, the paper identifies and analyzes the patterns of installation entries and exits into and from the 
system
2
. Since the risk of carbon leakage mainly concerns the industrial sector of the EU ETS (rather 
than the power sector), we focus on the subset of installations operated by manufacturing firms. All 
such installations located in the 31 countries participating in the EU ETS are considered. As regards 
the time dimension of the analysis, the span 2005-2013 covers the EU ETS Phases I and II (2005-2007 
and 2008-12) as well as the first year of the third trading phase (2013-2020). Installation entries and 
exits into and from the EU ETS are events of interest in that they imply long-term variations in 
                                                     
1
 The “Back-loading” (Commission Regulation (EU) 176/2014) was a short-term measure for Phase III that postpones the 
auctioning of 900 million allowances from 2014-2016 to 2019-2020. The second intervention, more important, was the 
introduction of the Market Stability Reserve (Decision (EU) 2015/1814). This involves a mechanism whereby each year a 
given amount of allowances for auctioning is moved to a reserve if the allowance surplus passes a maximum threshold 
and, viceversa, it is returned to the market if the surplus falls below a minimum threshold. This mechanism will be in 
operation as of 2019. 
2
 In the EU ETS, installations are plants or plant subunits. 
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production activity. Entries signal increased production: they either reflect the operation of a new 
installation or the expansion of an existing one above the minimum threshold to be subject to the EU 
ETS. Exits signal reduced production: they either reflect the shutdown of an installation or the 
reduction of one to a level below the minimum threshold. 
Installation entries and exits are dependent on a multitude of variables, including microeconomic, 
macroeconomic and institutional characteristics or conditions. In the second half of the paper, we 
explore the significance and the relative importance of a range of such factors within a hazard model 
for the event of an installation exiting the system. The model allows for both time-invariant and time-
varying factors which statistically make an installation more likely to exit the EU ETS. No attempt is 
made to model installation entries because we are not able to mechanically identify what we call 
“regulatory entries”, that is, installations entering the EU ETS as a result of occasional changes in 
regulation. The hazard model for installation exits is fitted to a three-tier panel dataset constructed 
expressly for this study by matching installation-level data with both firm-level- and economy-level 
data drawn from external sources. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the patterns of the installation entries and 
exits. Section 3 presents the data and the model used. Section 4 discusses the estimation results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Installation entries and exits 
2.1 Identifying entries and exits 
The Union registry is the accounting system that keeps track of the ownership of the emission 
allowances issued under the EU ETS and held in electronic accounts. The EU Transaction Log
3
 
(EUTL) operates the Union registry by checking, recording and authorizing the transactions of the 
emission allowances and by verifying the compliance of the installation operators with respect to their 
emissions and the allowances surrendered. The EUTL interface presents itself as similar to a database 
comprising two main sections, one devoted to the allowance transactions and the other to the 
installation operators’ compliance status. All EUTL information used in this study is drawn from the 
compliance section, in which both the installations and the installation operators are identified and the 
annual amounts of emissions, free allowances received and allowances surrendered are reported
4
. 
The closure of an Operator Holding Account (OHA), as the accounts tied to an installation are 
called, marks the end of the corresponding installation’s participation in the EU ETS. This event 
implies either the cessation of the installation’s production activity or its production capacity falling 
below the relevant minimum threshold
5
. For each installation, the EUTL shows the date on which the 
permit to participate in the EU ETS was issued (the permit entry date) as well as whether and when the 
same permit expired or was revoked (the permit expiry/revocation date), in which case the account 
was also closed. However, the latter date does not coincide with the time of cessation or downscale of 
production activity, which may have taken place even several months earlier. Moreover, the permit 
entry date may not signal the start or upscale of production activity, defining what we call in this paper 
an “economic entry”. The date may instead reflect a change in regulation whereby a pre-existing plant 
comes to fall under the EU ETS, constituting a “regulatory entry”. As long as we are interested in the 
                                                     
3
 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/. 
4
 Mastering the EUTL for analysis purposes can take some time. Jong (2015) provides a technical description of the EUTL 
which can help in this endeavor. 
5
 The thresholds are expressed in terms of production capacity or output. For most sectors, the EU ETS covers installations 
with a net heat excess of 20 MW. The list of the sector-specific thresholds is found in Annex I to the EU ETS Directive 
(2003/87/EC, 2009/29/EC). 
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causes of installation entries and exits, we want to locate such events at the actual time of the leap or 
drop in production (for entries and exits, respectively). Concerning exits, we can locate the year an 
installation’s production activity ceased or was sufficiently downscaled to drop out of the EU ETS by 
looking at the installation’s emissions. The same general approach is used for identifying the timing of 
installation entries, though it still leaves us unable to mechanically distinguish between regulatory 
entries (occurring during the course of a trading phase) and economic entries, these two being defined 
as above. 
Every year, in mid-May, each installation’s verified emissions (VE) pertaining to the previous 
calendar year, t, are published in the EUTL. Thus, for a given installation, VEt > 0 implies production 
activity was carried out during t; VEt = 0 implies the installation was idle for the entire year; and 
missing VE information (if not merely due to administrative delays) means participation in the EU 
ETS had either terminated or not started yet. Our approach for locating installation entries and exits in 
correspondence with the leap or drop in production activity rests on this set of simple deductions. 
Accordingly, we identify the exit year as the last one with positive emissions, conditional on the 
account having been closed
6
. Since an account can only be closed once, conditioning the exit event on 
the account being closed rules out the possibility of counting temporary cessations of production 
activity
7
. In more formal terms, 
 
installation i is considered to have exited in t if 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑖's account is closed 
AND
𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 > 0
AND
𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 = 0 OR = . (missing), ∀n=1,2,…,T-t
 
 
where T (>t) is the most recent year for which VE information is available. 
 
By the same token,  
 
installation i is considered to have entered in t if 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑡 > 1 
AND
𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 > 0
AND
𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡−𝑛 = 0 OR = . (missing), ∀n=1,2,…,t-1
 
 
where t = 1 is the first year the country in which i is located participated in the EU ETS. 
The entry rule above does not allow for entries occurring in the first year a country joined the EU 
ETS, that is, in t = 1. Without VE information for previous years, it is assumed that the installations 
with VEt=1 > 0 had existed since at least the year before. For this reason and because regulatory entries 
are not distinguished from economic entries, the entry patterns thus derived are not perfectly 
comparable with the corresponding exit patterns. A second remark is that the exit rule and the entry 
rule above are not mutually exclusive. That is, they can be both verified for a given installation. This is 
true for the installations that entered some year after t = 1 and exited sometime before T
8
. 
Table 1 shows two distributions of EU ETS installations by the entry and exit events as just 
defined. The distribution in the left panel includes all the installations with VE > 0 in at least one year 
                                                     
6
 The EUTL reports the current status of all OHAs as “open” or “closed”. 
7
 It also rules out the possibility of counting installations that opted-out of the EU ETS at the start of Phase III. 
8
 In theory, an installation could enter and exit in the same year. In practice, such cases are few in number. 
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between 2005 and 2012. It thus includes all the installations participating in the EU ETS since before 
2013, without distinctions as to the type of installation or other characteristics: thermal power plants, 
manufacturing installations and all other installations are included. The distribution in the right panel 
only differs in that it is limited to the installations operated by manufacturing firms
9
. It turns out that 
59.9% of the installations in this subset have been in the EU ETS since t = 1 and never exited, 13.4% 
entered in t > 1, 23.2% exited before T = 2014 and 3.6% both entered in t > 1 and exited before 2014. 
The corresponding shares for the distribution of all EU ETS installations (left panel) are similar, only 
exhibiting slightly fewer exits (21%) and slightly more entries (14.9%). 
Table 1 – Installations with positive VE between 2005 and 2012, by entry and exit events 
 All installations 
Installations operated by 
manufacturing firms 
Event number % number % 
No entry or exit 
event 
7651 60.3 3891 59.9 
Entry 1892 14.9 870 13.4 
Exit 2662 21.0 1507 23.2 
Entry and exit 481 3.8 232 3.6 
Total 12686 100 6500 100 
2.2 Distribution of installations 
Before focusing on the derived patterns of installation exits and entries, let us inspect the distribution 
of installations across countries and economic sectors. As the distribution can be rendered at different 
aggregation levels, the one reported in Table 2 is a working compromise between detail and 
conciseness. Just as in Table 1 (left panel), all the installations that have been or were (and no longer 
are) in the EU ETS since before the start of Phase III are considered. Six Member States are by far the 
most important in terms of number of installations (and emissions), namely Germany (1985), Italy 
(1216), Spain (1146), UK (1128), France (1118) and Poland (910). The sum of the installations 
located in these countries – the big six – makes up almost 60% of the total number of installations.  
  
                                                     
9
 Installations can be classified according to the activity of the operator using NACE information (see Section 2.2 below). 
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Table 2 – Installations with positive VE between 2005 and 2012, by country and economic sector 
 Country  
NACE-based sector Germany France UK Italy Spain Poland Others Total 
Food 115 143 117 154 109 115 330 1083 
Textiles 10 17 5 38 6 3 61 140 
Wood 22 6 3 5 19 23 75 153 
Paper 183 117 59 180 107 35 300 981 
Coke and petroleum prod. 49 14 14 20 15 23 63 198 
Chemicals 124 108 84 88 105 17 288 814 
Glass 104 52 25 58 39 18 115 411 
Bricks 148 56 63 24 284 49 428 1052 
Ceramics 58 1 9 5 37 33 82 225 
Cement 113 51 38 95 72 50 244 663 
Metals 64 33 20 47 33 33 192 422 
Other manufacturing 51 43 49 43 17 17 138 358 
Non-manufacturing 916 446 592 419 256 489 2644 5762 
NA 28 31 50 40 47 5 223 424 
Total 1985 1118 1128 1216 1146 910 5183 12686 
Note: Table A1, in the Appendix, shows the correspondence between the NACE Rev2 classification and the 
NACE-based sectors. 
Information from outside the EUTL was needed to derive the distribution of the installations by 
economic sector. This is because the EUTL only reports the sectoral classification defined by the EU 
ETS Directive (2003/87/EC, 2009/29/EC), which refers to the production activity carried out at the 
installation level. However, the type of economic activity of the installation operators is clearly 
important information for economic analyses of the EU ETS. On two occasions, in 2008 and 2014, the 
European Commission disclosed it by publishing the four-digit NACE codes of the installation 
operators
10
. The more recent information was thus added to our dataset
11
. Table A1, in the Appendix, 
shows the correspondence between the NACE-based sectors in Table 2 and the actual NACE (Rev2) 
classification. 
Still with reference to Table 2, the Non-manufacturing sector comprises the largest number of 
installations (5762). All installations operated by non-manufacturing firms, primarily energy 
companies operating power plants, fall into this sector. As regards the installations operated by 
manufacturing firms (6500), the Food sector is the largest in terms of number of installations. This 
might be surprising, since the food industry as such is not covered by the EU ETS. The vast majority 
of the installations operated by food firms, however, are energy production units and therefore fall in 
the EU ETS Combustion sector. The same is true for those operated by firms in the Textiles and Wood 
sectors. Table A2, in the Appendix, shows the distribution of the installations operated by 
manufacturing firms both across the installation-level EU ETS sectors and the firm-level NACE-based 
sectors. Ultimately, sufficiently detailed NACE information can make the scope of the EU ETS better 
appreciated and also enhance its economic analysis. 
2.3 Entry and exit patterns 
The patterns of installation entries and exits, these being identified in the way described, provide a 
novel piece of evidence concerning the past development of the EU ETS. The graph in Figure 1 
pictures the number of exits (negative values) and entries (positive values) of the installations operated 
by manufacturing firms, across time and countries. Figure 2 only differs from Figure 1 in that the 
breakdown of entries and exits is by sector instead of country.  
                                                     
10
 In Europe, NACE is the classification of economic activities used in official sectoral statistics.  
11
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/leakage/studies_en.htm. 
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Fig. 1 – Entries and exits of installations operated by manufacturing firms, by year and country 
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Fig. 2 – Entries and exits of installations operated by manufacturing firms, by year and sector 
 
 
The pattern of total entries is characterised by three spikes: in 2006, 2008, and 2013. The 2008 spike 
and the 2013 one coincide with the first years of Phase II and Phase III, respectively. Incidentally, the 
large number of installation entries observed in 2013 is unrelated to the sector enlargement that came 
with Phase III, as the new sectors are purposely not considered here. It would thus appear that the first 
year of a trading phase tends to come with more entries than the others. While this conjecture seems 
plausible, further investigation would be needed to ascertain whether it is actually true. As to the 
entries observed in 2008, they partly reflect regulatory changes extending the scope of the EU ETS 
within the UK. Similarly, the 2006 entries are largely explained by regulatory changes taking place in 
a single country, which is Spain in this case. In the UK, the increase in the number of regulated 
installations was mainly the result of the supersedence of the UK ETS (pre-existing to the EU ETS) 
and the Climate Change Agreements, whereby many installations had been able to opt out of the EU 
ETS during Phase I (DECC [2009]). In Spain, the regulatory change in question came through an 
amendment to the first National Allocation Plan
12
, which had adopted too restrictive an interpretation 
of the EU ETS Directive concerning its area of application. These examples demonstrate that very 
lengthy scrutiny of all the relevant national regulations would be necessary to distinguish between 
regulatory and economic entries. For this reason, our econometric analysis below only deals with 
installation exits. Another implication is that the difference in number between exits and entries is 
from an economic standpoint more significant than it looks: the more entries are in fact regulatory 
entries, the greater the imbalance between exits and economic entries reflecting increased economic 
activity. 
                                                     
12
 Government decree Asignación de derechos de emisión a las instalaciones afectadas por la ampliación del ámbito de la 
ley 1/2005, Acuerdo de consejo de ministros de 14 de Julio de 2006.  
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The exit patterns elicit a few more considerations. First, the number of exits is remarkable relative 
to the number of installations. With reference to Table 1 above, 26.8% of the installations operated by 
manufacturing firms and in the EU ETS since before 2013 exited before 2014. Second, despite 
regulatory entries being included in the count, significantly more exits than entries are observed 
overall. As Table 3 shows, net exits (exits minus entries) were 463 over the period 2005-2012, and 202 
(= 463 - 261) by the following year (2013). Such a steep reduction in total net exits reflects the inflow 
of installations with the start of Phase III. Third, net exits are not evenly distributed across sectors (or 
countries). Over 2005-2013, the two sectors exhibiting the largest installation outflows are the 
Ceramics and Paper sectors. In the Bricks sector, exits by far outnumbered entries over 2005-2012, 
but the outflow reversed into an inflow by the end of 2013. Fourth, clearly more exits occurred in 2007 
and in 2012 than in other years. This was unexpected, as the economic crisis had not yet started by 
2007 nor did it peak in 2012 or shortly before then. However, 2007 and 2012 are the final years of 
Phase I and Phase II, suggesting that the timing of these exits may be related to the design of the EU 
ETS. We address this question in the following section. 
Table 3 – Net exits of installations operated by manufacturing firms, by country (big six) and 
sector 
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2005-2012              
DE 25 0 2 30 20 0 5 45 51 14 -1 10 201 
FR 32 0 0 24 0 20 4 3 0 0 0 0 83 
GB -45 0 0 -35 0 -8 -15 -37 0 -16 0 3 -153 
IT -31 7 0 25 0 0 4 0 0 6 -3 -3 5 
ES -58 -3 -4 29 -1 -34 0 47 36 -4 5 -10 3 
PL 11 0 -5 6 1 -2 -1 13 0 20 -8 3 38 
Others 20 30 5 36 3 10 17 32 61 1 15 56 286 
Total -46 34 -2 115 23 -14 14 103 148 21 8 50 463 
2013              
DE -1 0 -8 -1 1 -1 1 -37 -3 -5 -9 -5 -68 
FR -5 0 0 1 0 -5 0 1 0 -1 4 0 -5 
GB 1 0 0 -2 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 1 -2 
IT 0 3 0 0 0 -2 0 -61 0 9 0 0 -51 
ES -1 0 0 0 1 -4 0 -68 -1 1 0 -2 -74 
PL 5 0 0 0 0 -6 -11 -21 31 -3 0 1 -4 
Others -10 2 0 1 -1 -23 1 4 0 -21 -9 -1 -57 
Total -11 5 -8 -1 1 -42 -9 -183 27 -20 -14 -6 -261 
2.4 The end-of-phase effect 
The pattern of total exits in Figures 1 and 2 presents no obvious relationship with the concurrent 
evolution of industrial production in the EU, which in the years of the recession reached its minimum 
in 2009. We have noted, however, that the peaks of installation exits in 2007 and 2012 correspond 
with the final years of Phase I and Phase II of the EU ETS. We suspect that this no coincidence, as the 
functioning of the EU ETS de facto incentivises the postponing of already planned exits to the end of a 
trading phase. 
This incentive may only arise for the installation operators who receive free emission allowances. 
For each installation for which free allowances are granted, given amounts of allowances are allocated 
at the beginning of a trading phase (or at the time of entry, if different) and for each year of the phase. 
Installation entries and exits in the EU ETS industrial sector 
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The allowances are handed out annually, but their initial allocation may be modified only in the cases 
of major expansion or reduction in the installation’s production capacity. As a result, the operators of 
installations which for any reasons were going to exit the EU ETS may find convenient delaying the 
time of exit only to cash in all the allowances they had been entitled to. 
Such delayed exits would entail rent transfers to operators of installations that are not economically 
viable, impairing the allocative efficiency of the EU ETS and thus its cost effectiveness in reducing 
emissions. Our data do not allow us to determine whether any of the observed exits were delayed for 
this particular reason. However, we can at least gauge the relevance of the question by comparing 
installations’ emissions with the amounts of free allowances received by their operators. With 
reference to Phase II, Table 4 contrasts the 10
th
, 50
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles of the allowance surpluses 
(allowances in excess of emissions) accumulated by two specific groups of installations operated by 
manufacturing firms. Namely, the installations that were in the EU ETS throughout Phase II and 
beyond (group A) and those that exited in 2012, the final year of Phase II (group B). The first two 
distributions show that the majority of all such installations accumulated significant surpluses during 
Phase II. However, our expectation is confirmed that these surpluses were significantly larger for the 
installations that exited at the end of the trading phase than for those staying in the system. With 
reference to the former, the 50th percentile tells us that the operators of 250 installations (50% of 499) 
received emission allowances in excess of actual emissions by at least 56%. The 90th percentile 
indicates that, in fact, the operators of 50 installations (10% of 499) received free allowances in excess 
of emissions by at least three and a half times (surpluses greater than 458%).  
Table 4 – Allowance surpluses cumulated over Phase II: exiting vs non-exiting installations 
    
Installation’s allowance surplus, 
% of emissions 
Country Entry year, Exit yeara Group 
Number of 
installations 
10th 
percentile 
50th  
percentile 
90th 
percentile 
All 
countries 
Entry before/in 2008, No exit by 2012 A 4258 -7.7 25.1 149.7 
Entry before/in 2008, Exit in 2012 B 499 -7.0 56.0 458.2 
DE 
Entry before/in 2008, No exit by 2012 A 703 -10.6 16.6 97.6 
Entry before/in 2008, Exit in 2012 B 52 -16.4 20.0 75.2 
FR 
Entry before/in 2008, No exit by 2012 A 485 -6.0 26.8 125.2 
Entry before/in 2008, Exit in 2012 B 20 -1.8 84.3 281.5 
GB 
Entry before/in 2008, No exit by 2012 A 279 -5.1 35.5 185.8 
Entry before/in 2008, Exit in 2012 B 81 4.3 70.2 419.6 
IT 
Entry before/in 2008, No exit by 2012 A 515 -13.8 18.2 97.3 
Entry before/in 2008, Exit in 2012 B 50 -2.5 81.2 289.6 
ES 
Entry before/in 2008, No exit by 2012 A 471 -3.8 39.5 202.5 
Entry before/in 2008, Exit in 2012 B 141 49.6 178.9 952.2 
PL 
Entry before/in 2008, No exit by 2012 A 266 -4.4 19.8 78.3 
Entry before/in 2008, Exit in 2012 B 24 -6.4 36.9 109.0 
Others 
Entry before/in 2008, No exit by 2012 A 1539 -5.5 29.2 168.0 
Entry before/in 2008, Exit in 2012 B 131 -7.3 70.7 922.0 
Surpluses of this magnitude are clear signs of allocative inefficiency. In Phases I and II, the allocation 
of allowances was under the responsibility of the national governments. The National Allocation Plans 
had to be designed following the criteria defined by articles 9-11 of the EU ETS Directive 
(2003/87/EC). The governments were left the choices of having a new entrant reserve and of 
continuing to give allowances for the installations closed during the trading phase. All states decided 
to create a new entrant reserve and almost all of them opted for the closure provision, that is, to stop 
giving allowances when an installation closes (Ellerman et al., 2007). However, while the Directive 
specifies how to define a new entrant, it does not give a definition of installation closure. Thus, 
different governments adopted different definitions. For example, in Germany, an installation is 
considered closed if annual emissions are less than 10% of the reference level; in Romania, it is 
considered closed if both emissions and production are zero for at least one year and the installation 
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will not be reopened. Today the allocative inefficiency problem should be less serious than it has been 
during the first two trading phases. As of Phase III, free allowances are distributed using common 
rules defined in the 2009 amending Directive (2009/29/EC). They are given ex-ante based on 
historical production multiplied by a sector benchmark. There is, though, an ex-post adjustment: if 
annual production falls below 50%, 25% or 10% of the historical production used for determining the 
ex-ante allocation, the allowances handed out the following year are reduced by 50%, 75% and 100%, 
respectively (Branger et al., 2015).  
3. The risk of exit: data and model 
The number of installation exits observed in Phase I and Phase II of the EU ETS calls for an 
investigation into the relative importance of different factors explaining the risk of this event 
occurring. We address this question by fitting a discrete-time hazard model for the installation exit 
event to a micro-macro dataset assembled expressly for this study. The model is population-averaged 
(as opposed to subject-specific), which means unobserved heterogeneity across installations is 
discarded. The estimated effects thus refer to an average installation or, equivalently, a randomly 
drawn installation from a heterogeneous population (Xue and Brookmeyer [1997]). There follows a 
description of the dataset and the model. 
3.1 Data 
The dataset constructed for this study has a three-tier structure comprising installation-level variables, 
firm-level variables, and sector/economy-level variables. The EUTL, the Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS 
database and the Eurostat database are the original data sources. 
While the EUTL offers unique information concerning the installations, it does not provide as 
much data which is directly usable for econometric analysis. For example, measures of an 
installation’s size are not given. We have thus created a proxy for the measurement of this dimension. 
Following the approach of the European Environment Agency (EEA [2014]), the production capacity 
of an installation is proxied by the maximum level of its emissions observed over the years the 
installation participated in the EU ETS. The second variable derived from the EUTL is the number of 
installations operated by the same firm. The rationale for considering such a variable is that the more 
installations are operated by the same firm, the higher may be the chances, for each of them, to exit the 
EU ETS due to consolidation of production capacity at the firm level. 
With the names and company identifiers of the installation operators found in the EUTL, one may 
retrieve information on the latter from other databases. In ORBIS, a well-known global company 
database, we have been able to identify a number of firms that, taken together, operate 88.5% of all 
installations. The coverage rises to 90% if only the installations operated by manufacturing firms are 
considered. These are high matching rates, but whether information on the variables of interest is 
available is a different matter. Indeed, the extent of data availability varies a lot across variables. 
ORBIS contains several variables potentially relevant to our analysis, but only some of them bear 
information covering sufficiently large proportions of the installations in our dataset. Among such 
variables, we have extracted five rendering different measures of a firm’s size: operating revenue, 
number of employees, total assets, net income, and added value. In addition, two pairs of variables 
capture different dimensions of a firm’s structure and economic health, respectively. The first pair 
includes the number of companies in the same corporate group and an indicator for listed vs non-listed 
companies. The other pair of variables includes a firm’s profit margin and its solvency ratio13.  
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Table 5 – Descriptive statistics of the independent variables (panel data summary) 
Variable Variable’s definition 
Variation 
component 
Obs. Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
gdp 
Annual percentage change in 
GDP in country where 
installation i is located. 
overall 
between 
within 
N = 42115 
n = 6117 
T-bar = 6.88 
1.07 
 
 
2.92 
1.48 
2.63 
-17.7 
-6 
-19.28 
11 
10.55 
11.28 
co2size 
Maximum level of 
installation i’s CO2 emissions 
over the years in the EU ETS. 
Unit: thousand tons of CO2. 
overall 
between 
within 
N = 42127 
n = 6119 
T-bar = 6.88 
156.38 
 
 
553.58 
498.31 
0 
0 
0 
156.38 
10776.4 
10776.4 
156.38 
instgroup 
Number of active EU ETS 
installations operated by the 
firm operating installation i. 
overall 
between 
within 
N = 42127 
n = 6119 
T-bar = 6.88 
2.79 
 
 
3.73 
3.93 
.63 
1 
1 
-10.54 
28 
28 
14.34 
employee 
Number of employees 
working for the firm 
operating installation i. Unit: 
hundreds.  
overall 
between 
within 
N = 29301 
n = 5255 
T-bar = 5.57 
36.48 
 
 
201.41 
173.51 
26.55 
.01 
.01 
-894.11 
5728 
4179.34 
1585.14 
listed 
Dummy indicating whether 
the firm operating installation 
i is listed on a stock 
exchange. 
overall 
between 
within 
N = 42127 
n = 6119 
T-bar = 6.88 
.10 
 
 
.30 
.29 
0 
0 
0 
.10 
1 
1 
.10 
profitmargin 
Profit margin (profit before 
tax / operating revenue) of the 
firm operating installation i. 
Unit: %. 
overall 
between 
within 
N = 30161 
n = 4598 
T-bar = 6.08 
3.12 
 
 
15.10 
12.40 
10.73 
-99.92 
-98.49 
-112.27 
100 
100 
86.87 
solvencyratio 
Asset-based solvency ratio 
(shareholders’ funds / total 
assets) of the firm operating 
installation i. Unit: % 
overall 
between 
within 
N = 32051 
n = 5203 
T-bar = 6.16 
42.35 
 
 
26.11 
24.94 
11.87 
-99.93 
-99.30 
-79.24 
100 
100 
143.07 
The Eurostat database is our third data source, though the only macro variable eventually entering the 
model is the annual percentage change in a country’s GDP. Other statistics added to our dataset are the 
annual percentage changes in industry electricity prices, industry gas prices, sectoral output and labour 
costs. Table 5 shows the definitions and the descriptive statistics of the substantive variables entering 
the hazard model presented in the next section. Similarly, Table A3, in the Appendix, reports the 
definitions and the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable for the exit event as well as those of 
the binary control variables for the years, sectors and countries, respectively.  
3.2 A hazard model for installation exit 
3.2.1 General approach 
Survival analysis is the area of statistics that deals with questions relating to time duration until a 
given event occurs. A concept central to survival analysis is the hazard function, which sets a 
correspondence between the risk of event occurrence, the event not having occurred before, and time. 
If time during which the event may occur is measured in discrete chunks (e.g., days, weeks, years)
14
, 
the hazard function, h, is the collection of conditional hazard probabilities across time periods: 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡|𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡) 
 [1] 
where T is a discrete random variable whose values Ti indicate the time period t when individual i 
experiences the event. 
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When allowing for the possibility that different individuals may have different hazard functions, 
the hazard function becomes: 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡|𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡; 𝑋𝑖𝑡) 
 [2] 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of variables which may vary both across individuals and time.  
The most popular approach to modeling ℎ𝑖𝑡 uses the logit transformation, which conveniently 
linearizes the relationship with the predictors
15
:  
 
logit(ℎ𝑖𝑡)  = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖𝑡 + …+ 𝛽𝐾𝑋𝐾𝑖𝑡 
 [3] 
where α0 and the βs are the coefficients.  
Estimation of the time-discrete hazard model in [3], by Maximum Likelihood (ML), involves 
preliminary rearrangement of the dataset into the person-period format (see Allison [1982], or Jenkins 
[1995] or Singer and Willett [2003]). A person-period dataset includes a separate record for each time 
period when individual i – an installation, in our case – is at risk of event occurrence. In practical 
terms, if i survives three time periods, including the time of event occurrence, i contributes to the 
dataset with three records; if i survives six time periods, i contributes to the dataset with six records; 
and so on. An indicator variable, 𝑌𝑖𝑡, takes the value 1 if i experiences the target event in time period t, 
and 0 otherwise. The model coefficients are then estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function: 
 
𝐿𝐿 =  ∑∑𝑌𝑖𝑡 ln(ℎ𝑖𝑡)+(1 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡) ln(1 − ℎ𝑖𝑡)
𝑇𝑖
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 [4] 
where individual i contributes ℎ𝑖𝑡 if 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1 and (1 − ℎ𝑖𝑡) if 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 0 (hence, in all previous Ti-1 time 
periods).  
In our application below, 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the observed binary outcome (𝑌𝑖𝑡 in [4]) indicating whether 
installation i exited in year t (𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 1) or stayed in the system (𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 0). 
3.2.2 Model specification 
We here present our population-averaged discrete-time hazard model for the event of an installation 
exiting the EU ETS. The relevant population is the ensemble of all the EU ETS installations operated 
by manufacturing firms. The model is fitted to a subset of the micro-macro dataset above described, 
spanning the nine-year period 2005-2013. 
The model specification that only includes the set of dummy variables for the sample years (d2005, 
d2006, …, d2013) provides the so-called baseline hazard function, which renders the time-dependency of 
the hazard rate. The model is then augmented with additional binary control variables and a number of 
substantive predictors (chosen among those for which sufficient data are available). With reference to 
the first, the following enter the model: 
 
a) A set of dummies for the sectors (12) of the firms operating the installations (s1, s2, …, s12); 
b) A set of dummies for the countries (29) where the installations are located (c1, c2, …, c29). 
As to the substantive predictors, those entering the best-fitting model are (see Table 5 for the 
definitions and the descriptive statistics):  
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c) The average growth rate of the economy (GDP) in the current and the previous year, in the 
country where the installation is located (econgrowth)
16
; 
d) The size (production capacity) of the installation, proxied by the maximum level of its 
observed emissions (co2size);  
e) The number of installations operated by the same firm (instgroup); 
f) The number of employees of the firm operating the installation (employee); 
g) A dummy indicating whether the firm operating the installation is a listed company (listed); 
h) The profitability of the firm operating the installation (profitmargin); 
i) The solvency capacity of the firm operating the installation (solvencyratio). 
Annual percentage variations in the indices of sectoral output, industry electricity prices, industry gas 
prices and labour costs have been considered, but their estimated effects were either statistically non-
significant or plausibly spurious
17
. Additional firm-level variables have also been tested, but either 
their effects are non-significant
18
 or too many missing values mean the sample shrinks excessively. 
To avoid potential simultaneity bias issues, one-year lags are used for the relevant installation- and 
firm-level variables. This comes with a cost: all observations from the first year are lost, as the ORBIS 
data on firm-level variables are not available for the years before 2005. The resulting specification of 
the hazard model for the exit of an installation is thus the following: 
 
logit (ℎ𝑖𝑡) = 𝜇 +∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑑𝑗𝑖
2013
𝑗=2007
+∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑠𝑘𝑖
12
𝑘=2
+∑ 𝜆𝑙𝑐𝑙𝑖
29
𝑙=2
+ 𝜃𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑜2𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛾1𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛾5𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡−1 
[5] 
where: ℎ𝑖𝑡 is the probability of exit, this event not having occurred before; the explanatory variables 
are defined as above; and the 𝛾 coefficients specifically denote firm-level variables. 
As concerns the model estimation, the ML estimator used is robust to potential correlation between 
the installations operated by the same firm. 
4. Estimation results 
Table 6 shows the estimation results for the hazard model in [5] (M6) and for five of its nested 
versions (M1-M5). Contrasting the six sets of results allows us to better appreciate the contributions of 
the different variables to the final model’s fitting19. The coefficients presented are exponentiated, 
implying they represent multiplicative effects of a unit increase in the predictor on the event’s odds 
ratio
20
. That is, for a given estimated coefficient ?̂?𝑘, 
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 To allow for possible prolonged effects of the economic context on an installation’s exit, we averaged the current GDP 
growth rate, gdpt, with those of the previous years (up to three). The variable constructed as the simple average of gdpt 
and gdpt-1 (𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 = 0.5(𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡)) turned out to fit the data best. 
17
 This is the case of natural gas prices, which turned out to be negatively correlated with installation exits.  
18
 Notably, the measures of a firm’s size which are alternative to employee are highly correlated with one another.  
19
 The results are directly comparable across the regressions, as they are based on an identical sample: one of 22266 
observations (N), covering 4293 installations (n). 
20
 The estimated (non-exponentiated) coefficients of the most comprehensive model version M6, the respective 95% 
confidence intervals and p-values, are reported in Table A4, in the Appendix. 
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𝑒?̂?𝑘 =
(ℎ̂| 𝑥𝑘 + 1)/[1 − (ℎ̂| 𝑥𝑘 + 1)]
(ℎ̂| 𝑥𝑘) [1 − (ℎ̂| 𝑥𝑘)]⁄
 
[6] 
Thus, an exponentiated coefficient not significantly different from 1 indicates that an increase in the 
relative predictor has no significant effect on the likelihood of event occurrence. By the same token, 
𝑒?̂?𝑘 greater (smaller) than 1 indicates that ∆𝑥𝑘 > 0 has a positive (negative) effect on the likelihood of 
the event occurring.  
The first model version, M1, only includes the set of dummies for the sample years. Relative to 
2006, which is the reference year
21
, the chances of exit turn out to be significantly higher in 2007 and 
2012 and, conversely, significantly lower in 2010 and 2013. The effects are quantified as multiplying 
the odds of exit in 2006 by 2.2 (i.e., the odds more than double) and by 2.0 in 2007 and 2012, 
respectively, and by 0.6 and 0.5 in 2010 and 2013. These effects are generally stable across the 
different model versions. The latter two are non-significant in M2, controlling both for sectoral and 
country effects, but they revert to being significant after controlling for the growth rate of the economy 
in the other more comprehensive model versions. The 2007 and 2012 effects reflect the observed 
pattern of total installation exits, which have been shown to be clearly more numerous in these two 
years (Figures 1 and 2). The end-of-phase effect, explained with the implicit incentive to procrastinate 
exit till the end of the trading phase (Section 2.4), is thus confirmed after controlling for a number of 
other relevant factors. 
Table 6 – Estimation results, exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
d:2007 2.2127*** 2.3910*** 2.5771*** 2.5783*** 2.6547*** 2.6396*** 
d:2008 1.2394 1.4335** 1.3114 1.3167 1.3476* 1.4015* 
d:2009 1.1967 1.5000** 0.8469 0.8472 0.8537 0.8602 
d:2010  0.6328** 0.7785 0.4669*** 0.4683*** 0.4793*** 0.4720*** 
d:2011 0.6937* 0.8594 0.7378 0.7408 0.7707 0.7559 
d:2012 2.0835*** 2.6442*** 1.9682*** 1.9804*** 2.0638*** 2.0500*** 
d:2013 0.5628** 0.7064 0.4777*** 0.4819*** 0.5026*** 0.5000*** 
       
s:Textiles  1.8134*** 1.8176*** 1.7793*** 1.9884*** 1.8044*** 
s:Wood  1.1805 1.1767 1.1622 1.2434 1.1495 
s:Paper  0.6748** 0.6749** 0.6900** 0.7334** 0.7329** 
s:Coke and petroleum prod.  0.5106** 0.5096** 0.9871 1.0928 1.0899 
s:Chemicals  0.6048*** 0.6017*** 0.6542** 0.7187** 0.7502* 
s:Glass  0.3611*** 0.3623*** 0.3740*** 0.3889*** 0.4263*** 
s:Bricks  0.9753 0.9747 0.9629 0.8598 0.8595 
s:Ceramics  15.4088*** 15.7903*** 15.5042*** 16.2966*** 16.6012*** 
s:Cement  0.5634*** 0.5619*** 0.7715 0.7574 0.8571 
s:Metals  0.6583* 0.6597* 0.7935 0.8550 0.8334 
s:Other manufacturing  1.2992 1.2958 1.2737 1.5409** 1.3680* 
       
c:CY  3.0650*** 3.1366*** 5.0445*** 5.1615*** 6.8577*** 
c:CZ  0.5925** 0.6548* 0.6359* 0.6783 0.8236 
c:ES  0.7335* 0.6690** 0.6535** 0.7822 0.8266 
c:FR  0.5761*** 0.5225*** 0.5136*** 0.5462*** 0.5725*** 
c:GR  0.5984 0.4312* 0.4209* 0.4783* 0.4557* 
c:IE  2.2751* 2.1248* 2.1597* 2.6912** 2.4622** 
c:IT  0.8056 0.6412** 0.6202** 0.6717** 0.6797** 
c:SE  0.5777* 0.5892 0.5556* 0.6265 0.7222 
c:SI  0.4698* 0.4694* 0.4351** 0.4867* 0.5328 
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c:SK  1.5215 2.1439** 2.1532** 2.4359*** 2.4426*** 
       
econgrowth   0.8887*** 0.8883*** 0.8882*** 0.9023*** 
co2size    0.9989* 0.9988* 0.9988* 
instgroup     1.0447*** 1.0468*** 
employee     0.9993** 0.9994** 
listed     1.2344 1.3353** 
profitmargin      0.9869*** 
solvencyratio      0.9919*** 
       
constant 0.0284*** 0.0329*** 0.0494*** 0.0523*** 0.0397*** 0.0514*** 
       
Observations (N) 22666 22666 22666 22666 22666 22666 
Installations (n) 4293 4293 4293 4293 4293 4293 
Log-likelihood -3188.8818 -3007.9302 -3001.9154 -2986.2626 -2970.3963 -2935.3965 
Pseudo-R2 0.0259 0.0812 0.0830 0.0878 0.0926 0.1033 
AIC 6393.7635 6099.8604 6089.8308 6060.5251 6034.7926 5968.7931 
Note: p-value: * < .1; ** < .05; *** < .01. 
The inclusion of both sectoral and country controls, in M2, greatly improves the model’s fitting, as 
shown by the Pseudo-R
2
 passing from .02 to .08. Relative to an average installation operated by a firm 
in the Food sector, the reference sector, the odds of exiting the EU ETS for a randomly drawn 
installation operated by a firm in the Ceramics sector are about 15 times as high. Such a large effect 
reflects the observed rapid shrinkage of the Ceramics sector in terms of number of installations, a 
phenomenon more pronounced than for any of the other sectors
22
. The only other sector with an odds 
ratio significantly greater than 1 in all the model versions, though of a much smaller magnitude (about 
1.8), is the Textiles sector. A long-term trend of competitiveness deterioration (unrelated to carbon 
regulation) underlies this particular effect. By contrast, the chances of exit are substantially lower for 
installations operated by firms in the Glass sector and in the Paper sector. The respective odds are on 
average about 60% and 30% lower than for installations operated by firms in the reference Food 
sector. For space reasons, Table 6 only reports results for the country dummies whose effects are 
found statistically significant in at least one of the model versions. Relative to an average installation 
located in Germany, the reference country, the odds of exiting the EU ETS are significantly higher for 
randomly drawn installations located in Cyprus, Ireland and Slovakia. Viceversa, the odds are lower 
for installations in Greece, France and Italy. What factors underlie these effects may be a question 
worth exploring. The introduction of a variable measuring the growth rate of the economy in the 
country where the installation is located (econgrowth) characterizes M3. The economic context is 
found to have a significant effect on the likelihood of an installation exiting the EU ETS, as one would 
expect. Controlling for economic growth also proves to be important in relation to the identification of 
the baseline hazard function rendered through the set of year dummies. For example, year 2009, 
corresponding to the peak of the economic crisis, ceases to be riskier than 2006, the base year, after 
econgrowth enters the equation. 
The model version M4 introduces the only installation-level variable accounted for in our analysis 
(co2size). The size of an installation, proxied by the maximum level of its observed emissions, turns 
out to have a negative effect on the chances of exit, though only at the .1 significance level. A negative 
effect is indeed expected based on the presumption that bigger plants are more costly to close down 
and that they are less likely to see their capacity reduced below the minimum threshold. The odds ratio 
obtained indicates that a difference in production capacity proxied by 1,000 tons of CO2 emissions per 
year adjusts the odds of an installation exiting by 1%. Detailing the model further, three firm-level 
variables are introduced by M5: the total number of EU ETS installations operated (instgroup), the 
total number of employees (employee) and a dummy indicating whether the firm is a listed company 
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(listed). The first effect is positive and highly significant. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
firms may consolidate their production capacity by closing down some of the installations they 
operate. In quantitative terms, one extra installation increases the odds of exit for each of the other 
installations operated by the same firm by about 4.5%. Conversely, installations operated by firms 
with a larger number of employees are less likely to exit. Nevertheless, the chances to exit are higher 
for installations operated by listed companies. Such an effect, statistically significant in M6 (not in 
M5), may be a hint of a correlation between diffused ownership and the mobility of productive capital. 
Finally, the model version M6 brings in direct measures of the profitability (profitmargin) and the 
solvency capacity (solvencyratio) of the firm operating the installation. Both effects are significant and 
have the expected sign: the likelihood of an installation exiting decreases with the improved economic 
and financial health of the relative firm.  
To appreciate the relative importance of the different factors affecting the likelihood of an 
installation exiting the EU ETS, we compare the effects of plausible variations in the respective 
variables. We first take to be plausible the variations equal to one standard deviation of the 
installation-level sample means. That is, with reference to Table 5, we consider variations (∆𝑥𝑘) equal 
to the standard deviations between installations (498.31 for co2size, 3.93 for instgroup, etc.). The 
respective effects are then derived as percentage changes in the odds of exit:  
 
𝑒(?̂?𝑘∆𝑥𝑘) − 1 =
{(ℎ̂| 𝑥𝑘 + ∆𝑥𝑘)/[1 − (ℎ̂| 𝑥𝑘 + ∆𝑥𝑘)]} − (ℎ̂| 𝑥𝑘) [1 − (ℎ̂| 𝑥𝑘)]⁄
(ℎ̂| 𝑥𝑘) [1 − (ℎ̂| 𝑥𝑘)]⁄
 
[7] 
Figure 3 shows the effects thus derived for positive variations (∆𝑥𝑘 > 0) in the substantive variables 
entering M6. The two largest effects are observed for the greater size of an installation (co2size) and 
for the status of a firm as a listed company relative to a non-listed one (listed). The first effect is an 
average 40% reduction in the odds of exit. The second effect amounts to an average 30% increase. 
However, uncertainty concerning both of these effects is quite high, which is the consequence of wide 
confidence intervals for the respective estimated coefficients (Table A2, in the Appendix). Smaller but 
more accurately identified effects are found for the other remaining variables. 
Fig. 3 – Effects comparison of one standard deviation increase in independent variables. 
 
Note: The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
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5. Conclusions 
A pessimistic view of the EU ETS is that the carbon costs burdening the firms operating in the 
regulated sectors will eventually result in the relocation of some production activities to countries 
imposing lower carbon costs. To date, no empirical studies have investigated whether this 
phenomenon known as investment leakage has been taking place. Answering this question implies 
identifying a statistically significant effect whereby the EU ETS causes the relocation of certain 
production activities. This paper brings evidence relevant to investment leakage in the industrial sector 
of the EU ETS, although it is not concerned with the identification of investment leakage. The first 
part of the analysis consists in ascertaining whether, where (in which countries and sectors) and to 
what extent the exits of installations operated by manufacturing firms have outnumbered the entries. 
By fitting a discrete-time hazard model to a suitable micro-macro dataset, we subsequently identify a 
number of variables (both time-invariant and time-varying) explaining the risk of an installation 
exiting the EU ETS. The results obtained and some methodological aspects of the study (e.g., the rules 
for the identification of exits and entries) may be useful for future attempts to identify investment 
leakage. 
The original contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. In the first place, it is the first 
study to systematically identify installation entries and exits into and from the EU ETS. The patterns 
identified indeed constitute a novel piece of evidence concerning the past development of the EU ETS. 
Secondly, it is the first study to estimate a model for the risk of an installation exiting the EU ETS. 
Concerning the findings, the results of the descriptive analysis show that the number of exits has been 
remarkable relative to the number of installations. What is more, there have been significantly more 
exits than entries, especially considering that some of the entries are merely the consequence of 
occasional regulatory changes in the implementation of the EU ETS at the national level. A question 
worth exploring in the future would then be whether this imbalance is entirely explained by the 
economic crisis which has hit hard the EU’s manufacturing sector in the last few years. Moreover, in 
terms of number of regulated installations, the sector that by far has shrunk more than the others is the 
Ceramics sector. Here, the very large number of installation exits observed in Germany suggests that – 
perhaps – the exits due to capacity reduction (rather than those due to the shutdown of the installation) 
might be more frequent than one would expect. 
The estimated hazard model identifies a number of different effects which generally meet the 
expectations. The likelihood of an installation exiting the EU ETS is found to be negatively related to 
the capacity of the installation (proxied by the maximum emissions level), the economic and financial 
health of the firm, the size of the firm (measured by the number of employees) and the growth rate of 
the economy in the country where the installation is located; conversely, it is positively related to the 
status of the firm as a listed company and the number of installations operated by the same firm. 
However, arguably the most interesting of the effects identified is one that reveals a limitation in the 
working of the EU ETS in its first two trading phases. Namely, we find that the chances of exit were 
significantly higher in the final years of the Phases I and II than at different times. This “end-of-phase 
effect” is interpreted as being the consequence of an implicit incentive to postpone already planned 
installation exits to the end of the current trading phase. Such an incentive, which stems from the rules 
concerning the closure of an installation and the withdrawal of the relative emission allowances, is 
detrimental to the allocative efficiency of the system and, therefore, to its cost-effectiveness in 
emissions abatement. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 – Correspondence between the NACE Rev2 classification and the NACE-based sectors 
NACE-based sector 
NACE Rev2 
Description of NACE sector 
1 digit 2 digit 3 digit 
Food 
C 10  Food products 
C 11  Beverages 
C 12  Tobacco products 
Textiles 
C 13  Textiles 
C 14  Wearing apparel 
C 15  Leather and related products 
Wood C 16  Wood, wood products, straw articles, plaiting materials 
Paper 
C 17  Paper, paper products 
C 18  Printing, reproduction of recorded media 
Coke and petroleum prod. C 19  Coke, refined petroleum products 
Chemicals 
C 20  Chemicals, chemical products 
C 21  Pharmaceutical products and preparations 
C 22  Rubber, plastic products 
Glass C 23 23.1 Glass, glass products 
Bricks 
C 23 23.2 Refractory products 
C 23 23.3 Clay building materials 
Ceramics C 23 23.4 Other porcelain and ceramic products 
Cement 
C 23 23.5 Cement, lime and plaster 
C 23 23.6 Articles of concrete, cement and plaster 
C 23 23.9 Abrasive products and non-metallic mineral prod. n.e.c. 
Metals C 24  Basic metals 
Other manufacturing 
C 25  Fabricated metal prod. (except machinery and equipm.) 
C 26  Computer, electronic and optical products 
C 27  Electrical equipment 
C 28  Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
C 29  Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
C 30  Other transport equipment 
C 31  Furniture 
C 32  Other manufacturing 
C 33  Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
Non-manufacturing ≠ C   Non-manufacturing activities 
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Table A2 – Installations (with positive VE in at least one year between 2005 and 2012) operated 
by manufacturing firms, by EU ETS sector and NACE-based sector 
 NACE-based sector (firm-level)  
EU ETS sector (installation-
level) 
F
o
o
d
 
T
ex
ti
le
s 
W
o
o
d
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er
 
C
o
k
e 
an
d
 
p
et
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 p
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t 
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s 
O
th
er
 
m
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u
f.
 
T
o
ta
l 
Combustion of fuels 
102
7 
134 144 96 23 707 4 20 12 78 116 343 
270
4 
Refining of mineral oil 2 0 0 0 153 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 157 
Prod. of coke 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 22 
Metal ore roasting or 
sintering 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 
Prod. of pig iron or steel 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 253 5 261 
Prod./process. of ferrous 
metals 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 1 28 
Prod. of primary aluminium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 
Prod. of secondary 
aluminium 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Prod./process. of nonferrous 
metals 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 
Prod. of cement clinker 22 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 392 0 0 420 
Prod. of lime, calcination of 
dolomite/magn. 
24 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 0 132 0 0 164 
Manuf. of glass 0 0 1 0 0 26 398 1 1 5 0 1 433 
Manuf. of ceramics 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 
101
6 
212 26 1 0 
126
1 
Manuf. of mineral wool 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 14 0 0 19 
Prod./process. of gypsum or 
plasterboard 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 10 
Prod. of pulp 0 1 0 93 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 97 
Prod. of paper or cardboard 0 2 3 786 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 791 
Prod. of carbon black 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Prod. of nitric acid 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Prod. of ammonia 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Prod. of bulk chemicals 0 0 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 
Prod. of soda ash and 
sodium bicarbonate 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Other activity opted-in 7 2 4 3 1 21 1 4 0 5 11 7 66 
Total 
108
3 
140 153 981 198 814 411 
105
2 
225 663 422 358 
650
0 
Note: See EEA (2014) on harmonization of old and new sector labels in the EUTL 
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Table A3 – Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and the sets of year-, sector- and 
country controls 
Variable Variable’s definition Obs. Mean Std.dev. Min Max 
exit 
Dummy for installation exit event (dependent 
variable): exitit = 1 if installation i exits in 
year t; exitit = 0 otherwise. 
42127 .0344 .1824 0 1 
d:2005 
Dummy for year 2005: d_2005i = 1 if 
installation i is observed in year 2005; 
d_2005i = 0 otherwise. 
42127 .1116 .3148 0 1 
d:2006 Dummy for year 2006. 42127 .1135 .3172 0 1 
d:2007 Dummy for year 2007. 42127 .1131 .3167 0 1 
d:2008 Dummy for year 2008. 42127 .1174 .3219 0 1 
d:2009 Dummy for year 2009. 42127 .1141 .3179 0 1 
d:2010 Dummy for year 2010. 42127 .1116 .3148 0 1 
d:2011 Dummy for year 2011. 42127 .1096 .3124 0 1 
d:2012 Dummy for year 2012. 42127 .1064 .3084 0 1 
d:2013 Dummy for year 2013. 42127 .1023 .3031 0 1 
s:Food 
Dummy for Food sector: s_foodi = 1 if 
installation i is operated by a firm in the Food 
(NACE-based) sector; s_foodi = 0 otherwise. 
42127 .1625 .3689 0 1 
s:Textiles Dummy for Textiles sector. 42127 .0190 .1367 0 1 
s:Wood Dummy for Wood sector. 42127 .0240 .1532 0 1 
s:Paper Dummy for Paper sector. 42127 .1593 .3659 0 1 
s:Coke & petr.pr. Dummy for Coke and petroleum prod. sector. 42127 .0340 .1813 0 1 
s:Chemicals Dummy for Chemicals sector. 42127 .1298 .3361 0 1 
s:Glass Dummy for Glass sector. 42127 .0702 .2555 0 1 
s:Bricks Dummy for Bricks sector. 42127 .1636 .3699 0 1 
s:Ceramics Dummy for Ceramics sector. 42127 .0143 .1190 0 1 
s:Cement Dummy for Cement sector. 42127 .1078 .3102 0 1 
s:Metals Dummy for Metals sector. 42127 .0612 .2398 0 1 
s:Other manuf. Dummy for Other manufacturing sector. 42127 .0536 .2253 0 1 
c:DE 
Dummy for Germany: c_DEi = 1 if 
installation i is located in Germany; c_DEi = 
0 otherwise. 
42127 .1732 .3784 0 1 
c:FR Dummy for France. 42127 .1096 .3124 0 1 
c:UK Dummy for UK. 42127 .0666 .2494 0 1 
c:IT Dummy for Italy. 42127 .1207 .3258 0 1 
c:ES Dummy for Spain. 42127 .1330 .3396 0 1 
c:PL Dummy for Poland. 42127 .0610 .2393 0 1 
c:Others Dummy for all other countries. 42127 .3355 .4721 0 1 
Note: Dummies for each single country enter the model. For space reasons, this table only reports the descriptive 
statistics for the dummies of the six Member States with the largest number of installations and for the group of 
all the remaining countries. 
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Table A4 – Estimation results of M6 
 Coeff. Std. error Z P > |z| 95% Confidence interval 
d:2007 0.9706 0.1626 5.97 0.000 0.6519 1.2894 
d:2008 0.3375 0.1781 1.89 0.058 -0.0116 0.6867 
d:2009 -0.1506 0.2346 -0.64 0.521 -0.6104 0.3093 
d:2010  -0.7508 0.2410 -3.12 0.002 -1.2230 -0.2785 
d:2011 -0.2798 0.1937 -1.44 0.149 -0.6594 0.0998 
d:2012 0.7178 0.1977 3.63 0.000 0.3304 1.1053 
d:2013 -0.6932 0.2620 -2.65 0.008 -1.2066 -0.1797 
       
s:Textiles 0.5903 0.2216 2.66 0.008 0.1559 1.0246 
s:Wood 0.1394 0.2328 0.60 0.550 -0.3170 0.5957 
s:Paper -0.3108 0.1502 -2.07 0.039 -0.6052 -0.0164 
s:Coke and petroleum prod. 0.0861 0.3563 0.24 0.809 -0.6123 0.7845 
s:Chemicals -0.2874 0.1597 -1.80 0.072 -0.6004 0.0256 
s:Glass -0.8526 0.2346 -3.63 0.000 -1.3124 -0.3927 
s:Bricks -0.1515 0.1443 -1.05 0.294 -0.4343 0.1314 
s:Ceramics 2.8095 0.2621 10.72 0.000 2.2958 3.3231 
s:Cement -0.1542 0.2382 -0.65 0.517 -0.6212 0.3128 
s:Metals -0.1823 0.2117 -0.86 0.389 -0.5971 0.2326 
s:Other manufacturing 0.3133 0.1854 1.69 0.091 -0.0501 0.6768 
       
c:CY 1.9254 0.3355 5.74 0.000 1.2678 2.5829 
c:FR -0.5578 0.2050 -2.72 0.007 -0.9595 -0.1560 
c:GR -0.7860 0.4354 -1.81 0.071 -1.6393 0.0673 
c:IE 0.9010 0.4436 2.03 0.042 0.0316 1.7704 
c:IT -0.3862 0.1944 -1.99 0.047 -0.7671 -0.0052 
c:SK 0.8930 0.3011 2.97 0.003 0.3029 1.4832 
       
econgrowth -0.1028 0.0353 -2.91 0.004 -0.1719 -0.0336 
co2size -0.0012 0.0007 -1.79 0.073 -0.0024 0.0001 
instgroup 0.0457 0.0095 4.82 0.000 0.0271 0.0643 
employee -0.0006 0.0003 -2.29 0.022 -0.0012 -0.0001 
listed 0.2891 0.1376 2.10 0.036 0.0194 0.5588 
profitmargin -0.0131 0.0027 -4.90 0.000 -0.0184 -0.0079 
solvencyratio -0.0082 0.0017 -4.68 0.000 -0.0116 -0.0047 
       
constant -2.96856 0.233446 -12.72 0.000 -3.4261 -2.51101 
       
Observations (N) 22666      
Installations (n) 4293      
Log-likelihood -2935.3965      
Pseudo-R2 0.1033      
AIC 5968.7931      
Note: For space reasons, only country effects that are statistically significant are reported. 
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